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McCarty v. Workman's Compensation
Appeals Board
The traditional office Christmas party replete with alcoholic bev-
erages was dealt a damaging, if not fatal, blow when the California
Supreme Court handed down the decision of McCarty v. Workman's
Compensation Appeals Board.' It may appear, at first glance, that
McCarty is an innovative twist or a radical departure in the area
of Workman's Compensation Law. But upon a reading of the case
and a review of the precedent used, this was neither an innovative
twist nor a radical departure but rather an application of the vari-
ous tests and standards which have been used by California courts
for well over twenty years to decide cases involving analogous ques-
tions.
Daniel McCarty, an employee of Apartment Plumbers, Inc., died
when he drove into a railroad signal pole on his way home from
his employer's office Christmas party. McCarty's wife applied for
death benefits under Labor Code section 4702,2 claiming essentially
1. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 6-5 (1974).
2. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4702 (W. 1971):
Except as provided in the next paragraph, the death benefit in
cases of total dependency, when added to all accrued disability
indemnity, shall be the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)
except in the case of a surviving widow and one or more depend-
ent minor children, in which case the death benefit shall be
forty thousand dollars ($40,000) and except as otherwise pro-
vided in Sections 4553 and 4554. In cases of partial dependency
the death benefit shall be a sum equal to four times the amount
annually devoted to the support of the dependents by the em-
ployee, not to exceed the sum of forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
The death benefit in all cases shall be paid in installments in the
same manner and amounts as temporary disability indemnity, pay-
ments to be made at least twice each calendar month, unless the
appeals board otherwise orders.
Disability indemnity shall not be deducted from the death benefit
and shall be paid in addition to the death benefit when the orig-
inal injury resulting in death occurs after the effective date of the
amendment to this section adopted at the 1949 Regular Session of
the Legislature.
Every computation made pursuant to this section shall be made
only with reference to death resulting from an original injury
sustained after this section as amended during the 1968 -First Ex-
traordinary Session of the Legislature becomes effective; provided,
however, that all rights presently existing under this section shall
be continued in force.
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that her husband became intoxicated at his employer's place of busi-
ness, and that as a proximate cause of his subsequent intoxication
drove into the railroad signal pole. The wife was awarded the death
benefits by the referee, but the Workman's Compensation Appeals
Board granted reconsideration and denied the award. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court issued a writ of review.
The high court laid down the essential facts involved in McCarty.
The employees of Apartment Plumber's, Inc., including McCarty,
frequently remained on the company premises after normal work-
ing hours to "discuss business and social matters, drink beer and
liquor, play poker, and shoot craps." The Court further states that
"the owner-managers participated in these activities, and often pur-
chased the refreshments with company funds."' 4 McCarty's wife
testified that "he (McCarty) would come home from work late,
with evidence of drinking about 75 percent of the time."5
On the date of McCarty's fatal accident, the employees were al-
lowed to leave work early even though they were paid for a full
working day. Several employees remained after and as one of the
owner-managers testified were "talking, drinking and playing po-
ker." The party was joined by business acquaintances and the
other owner-manager. Most of the liquor came from gifts the com-
pany had received; this supply was supplemented, according to
some witnesses, "by liquor drawn from a company stock purchased
for use as gifts to customers, suppliers, union officials, and plumb-
ing inspectors. '7
McCarty left for home about five o'clock in the evening, but re-
joined the party an hour later, bringing with him more poker
money and more liquor. The Court summed up the events that
subsequently transpired:
... when the party broke up about nine o'clock McCarty was
visibly drunk. Schlossberg (one of the owner-managers) and a
foreman both offered to drive McCarty home, but he refused. As
we have noted, while driving home, McCarty lost his life when he
collided with a railroad signal pole. At the time of his death he
3. 12 Cal. 3d at 680, 527 P.2d at 618, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
4. Id.
5. 12 Cal. 3d at 680, 527 P.2d at 619, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
6. Id.
7. 12 Cal. 3d at 681, 527 P.2d at 619, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
had a blood alcohol content of .26 percent, well above the minimum
needed to impair driving ability 8
The Court held that Ms. McCarty was entitled to death benefits
under Labor Code 4702, 9 since her husband's death was within the
scope of his employment with Apartment Plumber's. Justice
Tobriner, writing the majority opinion, found McCarty's actions and
subsequent death to be within the scope of employment in that
the "activity was conceivably of some benefit to the employer"' 0
and that "drinking parties had become a recognized, established,
and encouraged custom at Apartment Plumber's. "11
Justice Tobriner's decision was founded on the scope of employ-
ment concept. The standards he used to arrive at and justify his
conclusion Were the "benefit to the employer" theory and the "cus-
tomarily incident to employment" theory.12 These two standards
have been used in numerous California decisions dating back well
over twenty years; 18 they are certainly not creative new standards
devised by the 1974 California Supreme Court to cope with the par-
ticular set of facts involved in McCarty.
Perhaps the most effective way to elaborate how traditional and
consequently predictable the McCarty decision was is to compare
it with a 1952 California Supreme Court decision, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission.14 As a matter
of laying the groundwork for such a comparison, a recital of the
facts of Liberty is in order.
The employer involved in Liberty was Swafford and Company
which operated a store and restaurant as a concession in a summer
resort in the Sierras. Mr. Swafford hired Dahler, a college student,
to work around the camp as a dishwasher and helper. Swafford
established a daily routine for Dahler, which afforded Dahler be-
tween two and three hours of free time each afternoon. During
this free time, Dahler, enjoyed various recreational activities, one
of which was swimming. He swam in a stream which was not on
the portion of property occupied by the concession. Swafford, the
employer, knew that Dahler swam occasionally and never com-
8. Id.
9. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4702 (W. 1971).
10. 12 Cal. 3d at 682, 257 P.2d at 620, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
11. 12 Cal. 3d at 683, 527 P.2d at 621, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
12. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65.
13. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247
P.2d 697 (1952); Winter v. Industrial Acc. Com., 129 Cal. App. 2d 174, 27-6
P.2d 689 (1954); Satchell v. Industrial Acc. Com., 94 Cal. App. 2d 473, 210
P.2d 867 (1949).
14. 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247 P.2d 697 (1952).
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mented on it. Dahler assumed it was permissible for him to swim.
One afternoon, during his free time Dahler dived into the stream,
struck a mudbank and injured himself. Clearly, the issue involved
is the same issue involved in McCarty, i.e. whether the employee's
injury is compensable as arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.
In Liberty, the employee was denied benefits arising out of the
injury; the Court concluded from the facts of Liberty:
• * * the only inference which can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence is that Dahler's injury occurred while he was engaged in
a personal recreational activity on his own free time in an area
without the orbit of his employment and beyond the control or
dominion of his employer. Under such circumstances, it cannot
be said that the injury was sustained in the course of or incidental
to his employment, or that it was proximately caused by the em-
ployment.15
Why did Dahler lose in Liberty and Ms. McCarty win in
McCarty? The answer can be traced back to the standards already
well established in California. An example is the language used
by the Court of Appeal in Employers' Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion v. Industrial Accident Commission. 6 In this 1940 case, the
Court said:
The true rule to be derived from the cases is that the injury is com-
pensable if received while the employee is doing those reasonable
things which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly au-
thorizes him to do. 17
The Court went on and stated the standards it used in determining
whether a particular act fell within or arose out of the employment
relationship and also defined the policy consideration within which
such standards are to be viewed:
If the particular act is reasonably contemplated by the employment,
injuries received while performing it arise out of the employment,
and are compensable. In determining whether a particular act is
reasonably contemplated by the employment, the nature of the act,
the nature of the employment, the custom and usage of a particular
employment, the terms of the contract of employment, and perhaps
other factors should be considered. Any reasonable doubt as to
whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in view of this
15. 39 Cal. 2d at 517, 247 P.2d at 700.
16. 37 Cal. App. 2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1940).
17. 37 Cal. App. 2d at 573, 99 P.2d at 1092.
state's policy of liberal construction in favor of employee, should
be resolved in favor of the employee.18
This test is essentially the criteria used by the McCarty Court
and the Liberty Court in determining the characterization of the
particular activities there involved. The two standards relied most
heavily upon in McCarty to find that McCarty's death was proxi-
mately caused by activities which arose out of the course of em-
ployment were the "benefit to the employer" test and "the custom
and usage" test.19
The "benefit to the employer" test, although not specifically men-
tioned in Employers' Liability, has been used in a number of cases
since that 1940 case. For example, in Liberty the court states that
"where the recreational activity was conceivably of some benefit
to the employer, the compensation award was sustained as inciden-
tal to the employment. '20  Such language would seem compatible
with the policy standards of liberal construction in favor of em-
ployees as espoused in Employers' Liability. It, therefore, appears
that any benefit, even of mininal value, would be sufficient to find
that the activity in question should be compensable and, although
clearly the language of the case justifies such a broad construction,
the Court in Liberty felt that the employee's activities in that case
presented absolutely no benefit to the employer.21 The Court com-
mented that the actions of the employee could be construed as "...
yielding neither advantage nor benefit to the employer, [and there-
fore] must be held to have been wholly without the compass of
the compensation law. '122
Whereas Liberty failed the benefit test, McCarty was found to
have passed it. Tobriner stated in McCarty, regarding the frequent
drinking parties on the premises of the employer:
such gatherings served both to foster company comraderie, and
to provide an occasion for the discussion of company business. We
conclude that since the owners of the company authorized these
gatherings, which conceivably benefited the company, employee at-
tendance falls within the scope of employment.28
Clearly, the employer is realizing some benefit from such a situa-
tion, not only from the discussion of company business, but also
from the general benefits that accrue from company goodwill.
This benefit standard was used in both cases. It was found want-
18. 37 Cal. App. 2d at 573-74, 99 P.2d at 1092.
19. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1974).
20. 39 Cal. 2d 512, 517, 247 P.2d 697, 700 (1952).
21. 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247 P.2d 697 (1952).
22. 39 Cal. 2d at 516, 247 P.2d at 699.
23. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 682, 527 P.2d 617, 620, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1974).
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ing in Liberty and found acceptable in McCarty. In both cases it
was one of the decisive elements used in the ultimate determination
of the respective Courts.
The second standard used in McCarty involves an analysis of
whether the activity has become a customary incident of the em-
ployment relationship. This standard has been used in many cases,
one of which was Employers' Liability, where it was phrased as
"the custom and usage of a particular employment ...-24 For
purposes of continuing the comparison, this standard will be ex-
amined through the decisions of Liberty and McCarty.
In Liberty the Court found that the employee's recreational pur-
suits were not customarily incident to the employment relationship.
At the time the employee commenced his summer job, nothing
was mentioned by his employers about recreational activities or
more specifically of the stream where the accident occurred. It
appears that the employer knew of the swimming activities of the
employee, but was not in a position to object, since the stream was
off the property over which the employer had control and since
there was not even a remote connection between the activity in-
volved and the employment duties of the employee. In California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission,
the Court commented, "there must be some connection between
the injury and the employment other than the mere fact that the
employment brought the injured party to the place of the injury". 25
The Liberty Court summed up its holding and stated that, notwith-
standing the liberal policy in favor of the employee, "it nevertheless
does not appear possible to stretch its broad purpose to cover a
case such as this".2 6
While the facts of Liberty failed to bring it within the "custom-
arily incident" standard, the California Supreme Court felt that the
situation as involved in McCarty fell within the standard. Clearly,
from the facts involved in McCarty, it can be gleaned that it was
a customary practice of the employers to allow its employees to
drink after working hours, it was customary for liquor to be on
the premises of the employer and it was customary for Daniel
24. 37 Cal. App. 2d 567, 573, 99 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1940).
25. 190 Cal. 433, 436, 213 P. 257, 258 (1923).
26. 39 Cal. 2d 512, 515, 247 P.2d 697, 699.
McCarty to drink on the employer's premises prior to going home.
The Court had little difficulty in drawing the conclusion that
"drinking parties have become a recognized, established, and en-
couraged custom at Apartment Plumbers (the employers) ".27
Very succinctly and very simply, the traditional standard was ap-
plied and it was found to draw the instant situation within the
scope of employment. Again it is incumbent to point out that the
two primary standards used to bring the activities of the parties
within the scope of employment are two of the same standards
which have been used repeatedly by California courts. 28
Having concluded an analysis of what McCarty said, perhaps it
would be worthwhile to speculate as to what was not said in
McCarty. For instance, would Ms. McCarty have recovered if there
had been no history of after work drinking parties, and in fact the
only party in question was the employer's annual Christmas party?
This is the situation of the great bulk of employers and yet many
of them have ceased giving Christmas parties because of McCarty.
Were they justified in their reaction? To attempt to answer this
hypothetical fact situation it would seem apparent, in light of
what has already been written in this note, that the particular facts
must be measured up to the time-honored standards which were
adhered to in McCarty and many previous cases.
Of course, as has been stated repeatedly, the two standards used
most extensively in McCarty were the "benefit to the employer"
test and the "customarily incident test".2 9 In attempting to pre-
dict or forecast any subsequent judicial decisions, it is prudent to
start from the last word by the particular court and work from
that point. McCarty was the last word to date and the obvious
starting point for any speculation.
By the language of the Court itself and from its reliance on Sat-
chell v. Industrial Accident Commission,30 it appears that, even
though the McCarty Court relied primarily on the traditional tests,
as between the benefit to the employer test and the customarily
incident to employment test, the latter standard is the crucial one.
According to Satchell and as reaffirmed by McCarty, the custom-
arily incident to employment test is independently sufficient to es-
27. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 683, 527 P.2d 617, 621, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69.
28. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247
P.2d 697 (1952); Winter v. Industrial Acc. Corn., 129 Cal. App. 2d 174, 276
P.2d 689 (1954); Satchell v. Industrial Acc. Com., 94 Cal. App. 2d 473, 210
P.2d 867 (1949).
29. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1974).
30. 94 Cal. App. 2d 473, 210 P.2d 867 (1949).
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tablish "scope of employment". Justice Tobriner in McCarty
comments as to the conclusion of the Satchell Court: "Without con-
sidering the question of possible benefit to the employer, the Court
upheld a finding that the injury occurred in the scope of employ-
ment."3'
An examination of the hypothetical fact situation needs to be
viewed through the litmus paper of the customarily incident to em-
ployment standard. The facts of McCarty were so aggravated that
the standard was met outright. But the facts of the hypothetical
situation are much more subtle. As in McCarty, there is no history
of drinking parties after work nearly seventy-five percent of the
time, at which the employees and employers discuss business, play
poker, and drink beer. Therefore, where shall the demarcation
point be made?
To begin to answer such a question is to break the customarily
incident standard into its two component parts and examine each
part independently of the other, the two parts being "incident to
employment" and "customary to employment". The first part to
be analyzed is the incident to employment component. Almost
always present in any employment situation, even under the most
favorable circumstances, as indeed a Christmas party may be, is
some indicia of duress; and even at a party where many of the
incidents of employment are broken down, there still remains,
perhaps much more sublimated than during a normal working day,
the knowledge that this is job-related and as such, the behavior
of employees at this ostensibly "social" activity may ultimately
have to be accounted for.
There is perhaps the situation where attendance at such a party
is mandatory-not mandatory in the sense of a company directive,
but mandatory in a much more subtle way. A person's chances
for success within a company may be affected by attendance and
participation at such an event. There are numerous psychological
factors which may arise at such a function which may at least in-
directly affect the employment situation. "Incident to employ-
ment" therefore could perhaps be found in the hypothetical posed,
but the test is "customarily" incident to employment. What of this
second component part?
31. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 683, 527 P.2d 617, 620, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1974).
How frequent or habitual need an occurrence be to be character-
ized as customary? In McCarty, the "parties" occurred, according
to McCarty's wife, about seventy-five percent of the time;3 2 this
is clearly customary. Whereas, in Liberty, although the employee
swam in the stream frequently enough to establish a customary
practice, the Court denied the application of the standard for want
of the "incident" ingredient.33 They found his swimming activities
to be completely within his free time and totally without any inci-
dence to his employment. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d
Ed.) defines custom as "frequent or common use in practice; estab-
lished usage; social conventions carried on by tradition . . ." As
pertains to the hypothetical, is "annually" frequent enough to be
"customary"? This is a subjective point and may well depend on
one's concept of time. The remainder of the definition refers to
established usage and social conventions carried on by tradition.
Clearly, a logical argument could be made that, if an employer
threw a Christmas party every year, this is tradition, this is estab-
lished usage, and perhaps this is customary.
Such a conclusion is, of course, highly speculative at this time.
But if in fact some future court is in a quandry as how to best
deal with the facts presented by the hypothetical situation, it is
highly probable that the traditional standards, the benefit to the
employer test and the customarily incident to employment test, will
be engaged. These standards have been the tools used for several
decades by courts in determining whether a certain factual pattern
falls within the "scope of employment" and from the indications
of McCarty these same standards are still viable and appropriate.
HARRY M. CALDWELL
32. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1974).
33. 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247 P.2d 697 (1952).
